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Abstract: Many governments have come to realize that the best way to manage natural resources is to include the 
resource users in order to increase legitimacy for governance. For the Sami reindeer industry, the Norwegian govern-
ment has implemented two different management models in order to meet this challenge. On the one hand, there is 
a corporative management model where a few democratically elected reindeer owners represent the whole industry 
in the annual negotiations with the government. On the other hand, there is a co-management model where reindeer 
owners are represented in boards at the local, regional and national levels where the government has delegated a 
number of  management functions. In addition, there is also a hierarchical administrative management system, with 
only public officials as employees. Nevertheless, through media, surveys and interviews, there has been observed some 
dissatisfaction among reindeer owners; they claim that the system is not inclusive. I argue that the election of  reindeer 
owners to the different co-management boards and the election of  reindeer owners to the corporative units have been 
challenging because it is difficult to establish systems of  representation that are fair for everyone. I also argue that it is 
complicated to make such comprehensive systems work in practice, as initially planned on paper. 
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Introduction
Some reindeer owners claim that they are not 
part of  the political and managerial system 
of  reindeer management in Norway. It is dif-
ficult to say if  this view is caused by lack of  
actual power among the reindeer owners in the 
corporative and the co-management systems. 
The problems could also be attributed to in-
efficiency in the regime because of  a lack of  
communication and co-operation between the 
different parts of  the co-management organi-
zation.  
This article focuses on power-sharing, co-
operation and participation. 1) It gives a short 
theoretical overview of  the two management 
regimes, corporatism and co-management, 
and the notion of  legitimacy. 2) It explores the 
two management models as they were imple-
mented in the Reindeer Husbandry Law of  
1978 (1978 law): The corporative organisa-
tion and the co-management organisation.  3) 
It discusses some main points and trends of  
the reform process of  the previous 1978 law. 
It will compare the changes suggested by the 
law committee and the changes subsequently 
implemented by the Ministry of  Agriculture 
and Food (MAF). Lastly, there will be some 
concluding remarks regarding power-sharing, 
user group participation, communication and 
co-operation (Weiss, 1994:42-43).  
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Fig. 1. The reindeer husbandry areas in Norway and the administrative centres of  reindeer husbandry 
management. The six reindeer husbandry areas (regions) denoted from north to south are: East-
Finnmark, West-Finnmark, Troms, Nordland, North-Trøndelag and South-Trøndelag/Hedmark.
Rangifer, 28 (1), 2008 55
Management of  Norwegian reindeer hus-
bandry involves a complex co-management 
system with participation of  user groups and 
stakeholders and power-sharing from the bot-
tom to the top (Jentoft, 1998:179-180). In this 
regime there are three organizational systems 
with vertical and horizontal interaction among 
all its organizational parts. 
Firstly, there is the hierarchical administra-
tive office system that goes from the Parlia-
ment, through MAF, further through the di-
rectorate–the Norwegian Reindeer Husbandry 
Administration (RA)1 with its six area reindeer 
husbandry administrations located within the 
six main herding areas at the regional level 
(see Fig. 1). These regional agencies provide 
reindeer owners with assistance and advice2 if  
needed. (Kalstad, 1999:206; Reindriftsforvaltnin-
gen [Norwegian Reindeer Husbandry Adminis-
tration] 2008:1). 
Secondly, we have the industrial corpora-
tive system that goes from the national inter-
est organization of  reindeer husbandry–the 
Sami Reindeer Herders’ Association of  Nor-
way (NRL)–to its six regional associations, 
also located within the six main herding areas 
(Kalstad, 1999:209). With this type of  politi-
cal system, the most important economic and 
political decisions are made together with the 
industrial interest organization and the state 
after negotiations. The power is often central-
ized in the hands of  a few elected people who 
use this power to make important decisions on 
behalf  of  its members (Schmitter, 1979:20-22; 
Østerud, 1991:83). There are many different 
constellations of  interests among the mem-
bers, and all of  them have expectations as to 
the outcome of  the negotiations (Rokkan, 
1987:104). 
Thirdly, we have the co-management system 
that goes from the Reindeer Husbandry Board 
1 RA is located in West-Finnmark, which is the 
largest reindeer herding area.
2 It would be help for instance with applications 
and to explain rules and regulations. 
at the national level, through six area boards 
at regional levels to the eighty district boards 
at local levels3 (Kalstad, 1999:182; Reindrift-
sloven [Reindeer Husbandry Law], 2007, §43-
44, §71-72; Reindriftsforvaltningen, 2008:79-164). 
Reindeer owners are the sole members of  the 
district boards. Members of  the area boards 
are appointed by the Sami Parliament and 
the County Council (Fylkestinget), while mem-
bers of  the Reindeer Husbandry Board are 
appointed by MAF and the Sami Parliament. 
The members are, therefore, politically active 
people with various professional backgrounds 
and many of  them are reindeer owners (see 
textbox).
 
Percentage reindeer owners in different boards.
The percentage of  reindeer owners varies among the 
different boards and changes every fourth year when 
new area board members are elected. From 1996 the 
area board in Hedmark/South-Trøndelag has usually 
had about 60% reindeer owners. The area board in 
North-Trøndelag has usually had about 60% reindeer 
owners. The area board in Nordland has usually had 
about 70-80% reindeer owners, but the newly elected 
area board for 2008-2012 has 40% reindeer own-
ers. The area board in Troms has usually had about 
70-80% reindeer owners, but the newly elected area 
board has for the first time 100% reindeer owners. 
The area board in West-Finnmark has, with only a 
few exceptions, had 100% reindeer owners. The 
newly elected area board for 2008-2012 has one non-
reindeer owner, the vice-chair. The area-board in 
East-Finnmark has also, with only a few exceptions, 
had 100% reindeer owners. The Reindeer Husband-
ry Board also varies from time to time. The current 
Reindeer Husbandry Board (2006-2009) has for the 
first time a majority of  reindeer owners. There are 
four reindeer owners and three non-owners.
The government usually delegates these co-
management boards some degree of  autono-
my by giving the board members a number of  
management responsibilities. The delegation 
of  such power is believed to make resource us-
3 The number of  districts often changes because 
some districts are merged while others are divid-
ed (Reindriftsforvaltningen, 2005). 
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ers more accountable and thereby more dedi-
cated to implementing management decisions. 
The intention of  participation and power-shar-
ing is therefore to strengthen the legitimacy of  
the system and contribute to better co-opera-
tion among the resource users (St.meld.nr.28 
(1991-92):120; Jentoft, 1998:71-72, 164-168; 
Kalstad, 1999:189).
All of  these systems are intertwined in differ-
ent ways, resulting in a system where reindeer 
owners have a say in management of  reindeer 
husbandry from the bottom-level all the way 
up to MAF. The management system in Nor-
way is unique when compared to management 
of  reindeer husbandry in other countries such 
as Sweden, Finland, the US (Alaska) and Rus-
sia (Ulvevadet & Russell, 2004:154-155). 
Despite a high degree of  participatory de-
mocracy, research demonstrates that there is 
some dissatisfaction among reindeer owners 
and they claim that they feel powerless in this 
political system4 (Sara, 1993: 125-129; Sara & 
Karlstad, 1993:43-45; Paine, 1994:134-167; 
Hågvar, 2006:177-179). How can this be? 
Methodologically, the findings in the article 
are based primarily on a study of  documents. 
It has a special emphasis on the law commit-
tee’s recommendation concerning the content 
of  the new Reindeer Husbandry Law (NOU 
2001:35), and it also uses some of  the com-
mittee members as informants (Lofland & 
Lofland, 1995:71). This study focuses on co-
management and the committee focuses on 
co-management in parts of  its revision of  the 
law.
4 There are many reindeer owners who are gen-
erally satisfied with the current co-management 
system; for instance politically active reindeer 
owners, reindeer owners who do not experience 
difficulties in their daily activities such as conflicts 
with farmers or other reindeer owners, or those 
who have the opinion that the government has 
good intentions with the industry even though it 
is not able to satisfy all their needs.
Other informants are chosen for the im-
portance of  their position in the administra-
tion and boards as well as for their knowledge 
of  some specific aspects of  the management 
regime (Weiss, 1994:34; Lofland & Lofland, 
1995:61). Interviews were conducted with rep-
resentatives from the reindeer husbandry ad-
ministration (central and area [regional] offic-
es), MAF, the Sami Parliament which does not 
participate in the reindeer husbandry adminis-
trative system, representatives from NRL, rep-
resentatives from an alternative but currently 
defunct reindeer husbandry association, some 
private5 reindeer owners, representatives from 
the Reindeer Husbandry Board, representa-
tives from some of  the area boards, as well 
as two professors–Kirsti Strøm Bull from the 
Nordic Sami Institute/University of  Oslo  and 
Nils Oskal from the Sami University College 
(Lofland & Lofland, 1995:84-86). 
Representatives from MAF and the Rein-
deer Husbandry Administration (central and 
area offices), as well as Bull and Oskal are used 
as supervisors in this work, and their opin-
ions and statements are not personally cited 
in this study. The rest of  the informants are 
anonymous and their statements are therefore 




Centralized participation through corporatism
Schmitter (1979:13) defines corporate man-
agement as: 
“(….) a system of  interest representation in which the 
constituent units are organized into a limited number 
of  singular, compulsory, noncompetitive, hierarchi-
cally ordered and functionally differentiated catego-
5 Private reindeer owners means that the owners 
are talking only on behalf  of  themselves and 
about their personal opinions and not on behalf  
of  any organization. 
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ries, recognized or licensed (if  not created) by the 
state and granted a deliberate representational mo-
nopoly within their respective categories in exchange 
for observing certain controls on their selection of  
leaders and articulation of  demands.” 
Corporatism is a form of  social organization in 
which the most important economic and polit-
ical decisions are made together between cor-
porative groups and the state. Since the 1970s, 
a manifold of  different interest organizations 
began to participate at different levels in pub-
lic councils and decision-making authorities 
(Østerud, 1991:82). This form of  corporatism 
has emerged through voluntary co-operation 
between government and organizations. In this 
regard, there has been much discussion about 
whether the participating organizations achieve 
real power in the decision-making arenas or 
not. The answer to this will differ from case 
to case, because some organizations and sec-
tors are more powerful than others (Rokkan, 
1987:95-110; Østerud, 1991:82). 
Another form of  corporatism, which is 
more relevant for this discussion, is interest 
representation in government administration 
and management (Østerud, 1991:83). This 
kind of  corporatism is the usual way in Scan-
dinavia of  representing the interest of  a group 
of  people with common interests. The power 
is centralized in the hands of  a few who use 
this power on behalf  of  others. People have 
influence only through their membership in 
the corporative organizations they belong to 
(Schmitter, 1979:13; Williamson, 1989:80; Ab-
ercrombie et al., 1994:89-90). A central element 
in Schmitter’s definition is that the interests of  
a group of  people are represented by a lim-
ited number of  units/organizations. These are 
groups of  people who share common inter-
ests within a functional category (Schmitter, 
1979:20-22; Williamson, 1989:80), such as 
the reindeer owners. The reindeer owners are 
not heard directly by the government; instead 
they co-operate and communicate with the 
administration in the unit, or in our case, the 
industrial interest organization NRL, which 
represents the resource users (NRL, 1978). 
The interest organization communicates and 
co-operates with its members and organizes 
their interests into a program or into demands, 
which the leader subsequently presents to the 
government (Schmitter, 1979:20-22; William-
son, 1989:80). Some have argued that such a 
process makes the division between the public 
sphere and the private sphere vague (Rokkan, 
1987:103), and Rokkan argues that a close re-
lationship between the representatives of  the 
interest organization and the bureaucrats can 
make them less conscious of  the members’ in-
terests (Rokkan, 1987:104).
According to Schmitter’s definition, the in-
dustrial interest organization is recognized or 
licensed by the state, which means that the 
organization has a legal and formal right to 
speak on behalf  of  all the resource users ir-
respective of  membership, and in this way it 
is granted a powerful monopoly in mediating 
between the government and the industry. In 
some industries, such as the reindeer industry 
in Norway today, we find only one interest or-
ganization, NRL. In other industries we might 
find two or more, which gives the participants 
more choice and probably leads to a greater 
balance of  power between the people and the 
organizations, since the organizations must 
work harder to satisfy their members6 (Schmit-
ter, 1979:20-22; Williamson, 1989:80). 
Decentralized participation through co-management
It is understood that the main purpose of  co-
management is to strengthen legitimacy in re-
source management. It is meant to decrease 
6 We find e.g. two interest organizations repre-
senting the Norwegian farmers: The Norwegian 
Farmers’ Union and the Norwegian Farmers and 
Smallholders’ Union (http://www.bondelaget.
no/; http://www.smabrukarlaget.no/).
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conflicts among the social actors and make 
resource users accountable and thereby more 
committed to implementing decisions. Co-
management boards/arenas are usually del-
egated a certain degree of  autonomy by giving 
the participants different kinds of  manage-
ment responsibilities, for instance, in supervis-
ing that users comply with prevailing rules and 
regulations, by arranging constructive co-op-
eration among the resource users, and by pro-
viding information  regarding new manage-
ment practices and so forth. However, when 
co-management is working we also find other 
latent functions deriving from the co-manage-
ment process itself: we see the redistribution 
of  rights to resources and subsequent empow-
erment of  indigenous or local communities 
by including local knowledge in the decisions 
(Jentoft, 1998:71-72, 164-165).
The basis of  this discussion will be Jentoft’s 
definition of  co-management because it fuses 
together main elements from different authors’ 
ideas of  what co-management represents:
“Co-management is a collaborative and participatory 
process of  regulatory decision-making between rep-
resentatives of  user-groups, government agencies, re-
search institutions and other stakeholders.” 
(Jentoft, 2003:3).
Even though it is not directly stated, power-
sharing and partnership is an essential part 
of  this definition, because without these two 
elements there is no co-management (Jentoft, 
1998:164-165; 2003:3). 
In order for co-management to work in prac-
tice, a fair share of  power must be distributed 
among the actors. It is argued that supportive 
tenure rights, policies and legislation are im-
portant for this process. The main objective 
of  co-management is the attempt to establish 
a territorial representation of  a community or 
geographical district where close family and 
social relations play an important role and 
where the resource users share a common his-
tory and future. This socio-cultural closeness, 
combined with local experience-based knowl-
edge about the resources and a feeling of  some 
kind of  ownership and responsibility to the 
resource will, in theory, comprise the basis of  
co-management. Co-management is achieved 
through the implementation of  co-manage-
ment boards, where users and other stakehold-
ers are included in decision-making processes 
(Jentoft, 1989:143; 1998:166-168).
This is easier said than done. As Pomeroy 
& Berkes (1997) argue, whatever form and 
degree of  power-sharing the co-management 
arrangement achieves, the process will always 
be political. Procedures involve mobilized in-
terests and a struggle for power between dif-
ferent private actors, between public actors 
and between central and local levels (Pomeroy 
& Berkes, 1997:466,478). The issue of  trust 
is essential for the sharing of  power, because 
without some degree of  trust the state will not 
devolve power if  they believe it will be mis-
used by the resource users. Past experience 




The discussion regarding legitimacy is often 
complicated. The term is difficult to define 
and it is almost impossible to measure. The 
concept is widely used and refers to different 
situations. The modern problem of  legitimacy 
has become a problem of  political representa-
tion and consent. In order for societies to de-
velop positively, there must be legitimacy for 
rules and regulations. This would mean that 
the law is a critical aspect of  this picture, and 
adherence or non-adherence to the law could 
become an indicator of  legitimacy (Weber, 
1978: 32-36). 
People will have different reasons for ascrib-
ing to normative orders. Their view of  what is 
legitimate will differ as well as why they view 
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something as legitimate (Jentoft, 2000:142). 
Within the same society and even within small 
communities we can find different local tradi-
tions. This means that what feels right for peo-
ple with one tradition does not feel right for 
people with another tradition. Today, however, 
most sectors are governed by law, and this may 
be the most important source for compliance 
(Weber, 1978:32-36, 644-645). If  user-groups 
do not comply they are legally sanctioned. 
However, when there is legitimacy for gover-
nance then management will be more success-
ful (Jentoft, 1998:163-164). 
New debates about prevailing governance 
are constantly developing and changes are be-
ing made in order to increase legitimacy. Mak-
ing changes is a challenging process due to the 
difficulty for users in general to come up with 
concrete suggestions about what they want 
(Olsen, 1997:207-209, 213-215). People want 
different things and it is difficult to find unani-
mous solutions to prevailing problems. This is-
sue appears within the social heterogeneity we 
find among members of  society, and there is 
no easy solution to the problem (Christensen 
et al., 2004:134-136, 144-145). New orders may 
therefore be consensual for the majority, while 
they are imposed on the minority. Weber argues 
that even when agreements are formally volun-
tary, it is common to have some measure of  
imposition (Weber, 1978:50-51). In addition, 
those with sound and comprehensive knowl-
edge of  the organization and politics form co-
alitions and achieve power (Christensen et al., 
2004:145). 
Corporatism: Direct negotiations between 
government and user groups
Government and reindeer owners
NRL annually negotiates a reindeer husband-
ry agreement directly with the government 
through MAF. Besides the reindeer husbandry 
law, the reindeer husbandry agreement is the 
most important vehicle for the follow-up of  
the objectives and guidelines in reindeer hus-
bandry policies. In the negotiations between 
NRL and MAF important economic questions 
are discussed (St.meld.nr.28 (1991-92):63; Sara, 
1993:101-103; Kalstad, 1999: 185, 209; St. prp. 














The Sami Reindeer Herders’ Association of  
Norway
National level
Ministry of Agriculture and Food
Reindeer owners
Fig. 2. The corporative system of  the national interest organization of  the reindeer industry.
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Election of  regional and national executives to NRL
NRL is part of  the corporative system in 
reindeer husbandry (see Fig. 2). According to 
NRL’s by-laws §4, once a year members (> 16 
years old) of  NRL in each of  the six regions 
elect one person who is in charge of  the re-
gional unit of  NRL in their respective herding 
area. Additionally, they elect the delegates to 
the national congress. The number of  NRL-
members in each of  the six regions is propor-
tionate to the number of  delegates represent-
ing them at the national congress (NRL, 1978; 
Berg, 1997:119; Kalstad, 1999:209). Thus, 
when there are more members in a certain area 
there is more power for the reindeer owners 
in that area. 
The herding areas are geographically spread 
from the Russian border in the northeast to 
the eastern part of  South Norway and the eco-
logical environment varies throughout these 
areas from south to north. This gives the rein-
deer owners’ different conditions for action 
and consequently different needs and thereby 
different interests which results in different 
political objectives (Kalstad, 1999:210-211). It 
is therefore crucial that the leadership of  NRL 
has exceptional knowledge and understanding 
of  the situation in the various areas.     
Every second year the delegates vote for a 
president, a vice-president 
and for board members of  
NRL (see Fig. 3). The NRL 
board is comprised of  one 
member from each of  the 
six reindeer husbandry ar-
eas, as well as a president 
and vice-president and a 
total of  eight members. In 
this political process the 
delegates will vote for the 
leadership/president that 
will have in mind the best 
interests of  the area they 
represent (NRL, 2005). 
Thus, we see an organizational system where 
the reindeer owners have the chance and op-
portunity to participate and actively steer the 
policies in a direction that is good for them 
and the area to which they belong. The power, 
however, is given to a small number of  indi-
viduals, which means that the power is central-
ized but democratically elected from the bot-
tom to the top. With elections every second 
year, it is possible for the members to change 
leadership frequently if  they are not satisfied. 
Through this system, the industry is given a 
lot of  power and authority when collaborating 
with the state agencies.
The Reindeer Husbandry Agreement 
Each year in November/December, NRL in-
forms MAF of  its demands for the next year’s7 
agreement. In January, MAF reveals what offer 
the ministry is willing to give the industry. The 
negotiations start in February and are usually 
finished in March (St.meld.nr.28 (1991-92):64). 
Representatives of  the government have some 
flexibility, but also some (political) instructions 
they must follow. Policies that address ques-
tions about predators and reindeer numbers 
are already settled in the Parliament and there-
7 “Next year” is the following 1st July, and lasts for 
12 months. 
Members in each area elect delegates to the national congress
Delegates elect president, vice-president and board members
President BoardVice-president
Fig. 3. Election to NRL.
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fore not part of  the negotiation process at all. 
Management of  predators is placed under the 
Ministry of  the Environment through the Di-
rectorate for Nature Management, and cannot 
be regulated by MAF. Regarding the reindeer 
numbers, MAF has the goal of  reducing the 
number of  reindeer in Finnmark county to 
achieve a sustainable balance between pasture 
resources and reindeer density according to 
the decisions of  the Parliament (Ot.prp.nr.25 
(2006-2007):44). The total amount of  sub-
sidies is also decided in the Parliament, but 
can be slightly amended during negotiations. 
After much deliberation and negotiation, the 
government and NRL have always settled an 
agreement since implementation of  the first 
reindeer husbandry agreement in 19778. 
Co-management: Reindeer owners at the 
local, regional and national levels
With co-management the power is decentral-
ized and found on the regional and local lev-
els. There are several co-management boards 
in the management of  reindeer husbandry in 
Norway. Through these boards, which were 
instituted in the previous 1978 law, §6-8 and 
8 If  NRL does not come to an agreement with 
MAF, MAF will make its own Reindeer Hus-
bandry Agreement and send it to the Parliament 
for ratification (NOU 2001:35:37). 
continued in the current 2007 law, §43-44, §71-
72, reindeer owners are a central part of  the 
management of  reindeer husbandry at the lo-
cal, as well as regional and national levels. As 
will be described below, the administrative of-
fice system (see Fig. 4), is a co-operative body 
with the co-management organization (see Fig. 
5). Since this study examines the revision of  
the 1978 law it will be discussed first.
The district board
The reindeer husbandry districts are charac-
terized as being small, average and large, and 
there is a total of  eighty. The number of  rein-
deer owners in the district varies between two 
in the smallest district and around 400 in the 
largest district (Reindriftsforvaltningen, 2008:79-
164, appendix 1-9). In the 1978 law, §8, it was 
statutory that all districts have democratically 
elected boards. Each year all registered rein-
deer owners eighteen years of  age and older 
in the district9 elect a chairman of  the board, 
a vice-chairman, and 3-5 members and deputy 
members at their annual meeting. The district 
board will carry out working tasks stated in the 
9 Of  the almost 2900 reindeer owners in Norway, 
2289 are above eighteen years of  age (figure 
from 2007). The number of  reindeer owners 
over eighteen is not listed in the Ressursregnskapet 
(Ecological statistics) of  reindeer husbandry, but 
given by the Reindeer husbandry administration.
The Reindeer Husbandry 
Administration
Area Reindeer Husbandry 
Administration
Nordland
Area Reindeer Husbandry 
Administration
Troms
Area Reindeer Husbandry 
Administration
West-Finnmark
Area Reindeer Husbandry 
Administration
East-Finnmark
Area Reindeer Husbandry 
Administration
North-Trøndelag
Area Reindeer Husbandry 
Administration
Hedemark /S-Trøndelag
Ministry of Agriculture and Food
Fig 4. The administrative office system.
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law and its secondary laws, as well as in the cur-
rent reindeer husbandry agreement. It is also 
responsible for the day-to-day management 
of  the district and gives its opinion on matters 
regarding pastures, and administers common 
installations (for instance fences) and resourc-
es. The board supervises that reindeer owners 
mark their reindeer10, separate their herds from 
each other, follow-up MAF’s instructions for 
public reindeer counting and instrumentalize a 
common executive work-plan for the district. 
It is the lowest formal management level and it 
reports its activities to the area board at the re-
gional level (Reindriftsloven, 1978, §8; Lovens for-
skrifter [the secondary law to the 1978 law], §3-
8; Sara, 1993:125-126; Bull, 1995:400; 1997:21; 
Karlstad, 1998:251; Kalstad, 1999:204-205; 
NOU, 2001:35:56-57).
10 Each reindeer owner has their own specific 
mark, which they mark into the reindeer ear 
with a knife or use a plastic clip. 
The Area Boards
The six area boards are the co-management 
level of  the reindeer husbandry regions: South-
Trøndelag/Hedmark, North-Trøndelag, Nor-
dland, Troms, West-Finnmark and East-Finn-
mark (see Figs. 1 and 4). The area (regional) 
reindeer husbandry administrations function 
as the secretariat for the area boards. Accord-
ing to the 1978 law, §7, members of  the area 
boards are appointed by MAF and the Sami 
Parliament for a period of  four years. The area 
board is a professional advisor and provides 
the premises for public management and other 
cases regarding reindeer husbandry in the area. 
The area boards report on their activities to the 
highest co-management board on the national 
level, the Reindeer Husbandry Board. The area 
board consists of  seven or five members and 
deputy members. With seven members, four 
of  them, including the leader, are appointed by 
the County Council and three are appointed by 
the Sami Parliament. Consisting of  five mem-














The Reindeer Husbandry Board
Area Reindeer Husbandry 
Administration
secretary
Area Reindeer Husbandry 
Administration
secretary
Area Reindeer Husbandry 
Administration
secretary
Area Reindeer Husbandry 
Administration
secretary
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respectively. NRL does not have the right to 
appoint members, but it has the right to make 
suggestions (Reindriftsloven, 1978, §7; 2007, 
§7211; Sara, 1993:123-124; Berg, 1997:106; 
Bull, 1997:20; Karlstad, 1998:249-250; Kalstad, 
1999:205-206; NOU, 2001: 35: 47-48). As we 
see, the area boards are comprised of  political-
ly appointed members through political bodies 
(the Sami Parliament and the County Council). 
The individual professional background of  the 
members can be in fishing, farming, reindeer 
husbandry or some other business, but ap-
pointment is made according to their political 
party affiliation (Reindriftsloven, 1978, §7; Rein-
driftsloven av 2007, §72). The reason for this po-
litical focus on the boards is to make them as 
diverse and representative as possible (Chris-
tensen et al., 2004:112-115). 
The area boards have several tasks. Since en-
croachments of  pasture lands are one of  the 
most serious problems facing all reindeer hus-
bandry in the world (UNEP, 2001), the area 
boards are attentive when the county munici-
pality sends out draft plans for development 
purposes on consultation (høring in Norwegian 
language) to different stakeholders. The area 
boards give their comments on the draft plan to 
the county municipality; thereafter the county 
municipality makes a development plan. If  the 
area board’s comments are not taken into ac-
count in the development plan, the case will be 
brought before the County Governor for arbi-
tration. If  the parties still cannot come to an 
agreement, the case will be brought before the 
Ministry of  the Environment for a final deci-
sion. Further, the area boards control recruit-
ment to the reindeer herding industry, estab-
lish grazing periods in different seasons, divide 
areas into user-zones for the different reindeer 
herding groups, control reindeer numbers and 
so forth. Many of  these tasks must be approved 
11  A new reindeer husbandry law was implement-
ed on 1st July, 2007 and at the same time the 
1978 law abolished.
by the Reindeer Husbandry Board before a fi-
nal decision is made (Forskrifter til reindriftsloven 
[secondary laws to the law], 1978, §10).    
Both private and community interests im-
pact reindeer husbandry, e.g. farming, tourism, 
mining, power plants and lines and roads. On 
the one hand, the reindeer herding industry 
must have access to pasture land and migration 
routes, calving areas and so on, and it needs 
to be protected from encroachments. On the 
other hand the outside interests also have cer-
tain rights to use the land. This is why the 1978 
law states that the appointed members of  the 
area boards should be a mixture of  reindeer 
owners and representation of  other interests 
in the same areas (Reindriftsloven, 1978, §7).   
The Reindeer Husbandry Board
The highest co-management level is the nation-
al Reindeer Husbandry Board. It has supervi-
sory control of  the six regional area boards 
and serves as a court of  appeals for decisions 
made within these boards. Each year the Rein-
deer Husbandry Board reports to MAF, which 
also delegates important tasks to them. MAF 
is the court of  appeals for decisions made by 
the national board in the first instance. The di-
rector of  the RA is secretary of  the Reindeer 
Husbandry Board. The board consists of  sev-
en members and deputy members: four mem-
bers, including the leader are appointed by 
MAF while the Sami Parliament appoints the 
rest (Reindriftsloven [Reindeer husbandry law] 
1978, §6; Sara, 1993:123; Bull, 1997:19; Karl-
stad, 1998:249-250; Kalstad, 1999:204).  Here 
also NRL has the right to recommend mem-
bers, but it is not directly part of  the appoint-
ment process. The Reindeer Husbandry Board 
is a political body with political representation. 
The Sami Parliament appoints members of  
the board according to their political back-
ground, but the members appointed by MAF 
are people who are trusted with these impor-
tant tasks and are not necessarily party politi-
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cians. The board’s responsibilities are of  great 
importance for reindeer husbandry. Among 
other tasks, it determines the highest allow-
able number of  reindeer on the national level, 
the grazing times and zones, recruitment, and 
so forth. It can also impose directives to the 
area boards, make rules and regulations, and 
approve or reject decisions made by the area 
boards (Reindriftsloven, 1978, §6; NOU, 2001: 
35:46-47). Thus, there is a kind of  division 
in the co-management system where the area 
boards and the Reindeer Husbandry Board are 
mainly in the interest of  political representa-
tion while the district boards are solely user-
group represented. 
Management–from paper to practice
NRL – membership, power, and negotiations
Power through membership
When power is centralized such as in the 
NRL-system, we can assume that it is difficult 
to obtain a representation and politics that all 
reindeer owners agree upon because the orga-
nization represents a heterogonous group of  
members. Rokkan argues that this is a typical 
challenge for representative bodies in general 
(Rokkan, 1987:103-104). Of  the almost 2900 
registered reindeer owners in Norway, 238112 
are above the age of  sixteen and thus they are 
allowed to be members of  NRL (Reindriftsfor-
valtningen, 2007). Over time, we see that the 
membership rate fluctuates between 30-50%; 
where there is 50% during election years and 
closer to 30% in nonelection years13. On the 
one hand, this demonstrates that many rein-
deer owners are not using the political oppor-
tunities given to them. On the other hand, the 
decision to not be a member may have differ-
ent explanations. Reindeer owners, who for 
various reasons do not earn subsidies, might 
12 This number is not stated in Ressursregnskapet 
(Ecological statistics) of  reindeer husbandry, 
but given by the Reindeer Husbandry Admin-
istration. 
13  This information was provided by NRL.
not see the usefulness of  joining. NRL’s cur-
rent president, Nils Henrik Sara, addressed this 
problem in his speech to the national congress 
held in Mehamn on June 7-8, 2007. Sara stated 
that “NRL must work to change this practice, where 
people can sit on the sideline and do nothing and still 
receive the same advantages [Economic subsidies] 
as those who work hard for NRL’s goals. (This 
author’s translation). He refers to the classic 
problem of  “free-riding.” This behavior can 
be explained by two main strategies: firstly, 
the case can be that reindeer owners are not 
members because they have not completed the 
registration forms and paid the membership-
fee. According to Elster, this is a short-term 
rational behavior, because in the long run rein-
deer husbandry may gain power with stronger 
support of  NRL (Elster, 1995:42-44). Second-
ly, the case can be made that reindeer owners 
disagree with NRL’s political goals, and in this 
way it is more rational for them to boycott the 
organization in the hope that it will weaken the 
organization’s legitimacy and that it loses its 
position as the sole negotiator with the gov-
ernment (Elster, 1995: 104-105). A third and 
ideal strategy, in theory, could be that all rein-
deer owners support the one organization that 
has negotiation rights with the government, 
and work together to design broadly oriented 
political goals that meet the needs of  a wider 
group of  people. This is what Elster calls equi-
librium, because people’s plans are consistent 
with each other (Elster, 1995, 101-103).  
We find a higher rate of  membership in 
the southern areas with fewer reindeer own-
ers compared with the main reindeer areas 
in northern Norway (Kalstad, 1999:209). Ac-
cording to NRL’s statistics, membership rates 
decrease further north (NRL, 2005). However, 
since Finnmark County has the highest num-
ber of  reindeer owners, there are many more 
members of  NRL in Finnmark compared to 
the southern areas. Subsequently, Finnmark 
has many delegates in the national congress, 
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and thus a lot of  influence when the presi-
dent, vice-president and board members of  
NRL are elected. A crucial question then is: 
Why do so many reindeer owners decide not 
to join NRL and thereby lose the power they 
have been granted by the government? Aslak 
J. Eira, chairman of  NRL 1998-2006, states 
that this resignation is a way of  demonstrating 
that NRL’s political program is unacceptable 
to many of  the reindeer owner (pers. comm., 
Aug. 10, 2005). Eira further states that this 
is something the organization must work to 
change. There are several sources of  dissatis-
faction; but the most important issue may be 
that the subsidy system is most advantageous 
for reindeer owners with larger herds14. 
We find diverging opinions whether a higher 
membership in certain regions, for instance 
Finnmark, will affect the politics of  NRL. In-
terviews reveal arguments that higher mem-
bership rates will undoubtedly give this region 
more power. Others argue that because there 
is no formal organizational structure with-
in NRL that gives more power to the larger 
groups, except for the election of  president 
and vice-president, there is no advantage of  
being in the majority. Ultimately, it will be up 
to the board members to put more weight on 
the arguments and demands from the largest 
group or not. 
NRL – competition or monopoly?
NRL has had a monopoly on negotiation 
rights with MAF since 1976 (St.meld.nr.28 
(1991-92):64). However, when an interest or-
ganization has as low a membership rate as 
NRL, especially in Finnmark, it is bound to 
be challenged by user-groups who disagree 
(Jentoft, 2000:143). Kalstad argues that the 
14  Most subsidies are only available for those who 
have an income of  NOK 50 000, but less than 
600 reindeer (Reindriftsforvaltningen, 2005; 
2006). A large herd in this context is close to 
600 reindeer, but not more. 
delegate system has made NRL more effective 
and professional, but that it also makes some 
members feel excluded (Berg, 1997:142; Kals-
tad, 1999:209). In 1987, a large group of  rein-
deer owners, most of  them from Finnmark 
County, established an alternative industrial 
interest organization, the Reindeer Husbandry 
Association15  (Berg, 1994:143) which has been 
an advocate for traditional reindeer husbandry 
(Paine, 1994:179-180; Berg, 1997:142; Kalstad, 
1999:209). For many different reasons, this 
organization did not achieve any formal po-
litical rights. The most important reason, ac-
cording to MAF, is that the organization could 
not be viewed as a national organization, but 
more of  an organization for reindeer owners 
in the northernmost districts (St.meld.nr.28 
(1991-92):64). After the establishment of  the 
Reindeer Husbandry Association, MAF added 
to §1 in the Main Agreement16 that NRL must 
consult with other relevant organizations be-
fore the annual negotiations. 
In the mid-1990s, NRL invited representa-
tives from the Reindeer Husbandry Associa-
tion to participate in the annual negotiations as 
advisors (Berg, 1997:143). They accepted the 
invitation and participated in the negotiations 
for a few years, but according to a previous 
member, they dropped out when it was con-
cluded that NRL was more preoccupied with 
getting subsidies for the industry than caring 
about what the political changes actually did to 
the industry. The policy direction was already 
decided by NRL and MAF. This type of  situa-
tion is often a dilemma in corporative systems, 
because many believe that the industrial inter-
est organizations become financially depen-
dent on the government and thus pressured to 
be on the same side as the government (Wil-
15  Norwegian name: Reindriftsforbundet / Sami 
name: Boazo Ealohus Searvi.
16  The Main Agreement was last altered in 1993. 
This agreement is the basis for NRL’s right to 
negotiate and for the annual negotiations be-
tween NRL and MAF.   
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liamson, 1989:81-82). NRL has tried to change 
this impression and strengthen its legitimacy 
by including the leaders of  their regional units 
in the annual negotiations with MAF (Kalstad, 
1999:209). This strategy is meant to decrease 
the problem that Rokkan discusses– that at the 
grass-roots level, sometimes people feel like 
they are not being heard (Rokkan, 1987:104). 
However, it is difficult for an interest organiza-
tion to meet the needs of  all its members.  
NRL’s connection to the co-manage-
ment system
Interviews reveal that when NRL recommends 
members for the co-management boards, the 
Sami Parliament and MAF sometimes takes 
the recommendation and sometimes not. It 
is a statutory rule that NRL can recommend 
members to the area boards and the Reindeer 
Husbandry Board, and therefore its sugges-
tions should be taken seriously. The law also 
requires a reasonable geographic distribution, 
mixed professional qualifications and a rela-
tively equal distribution of  men and women 
among the board members (Reindriftsloven, 
1978, §6; 2007, §71), which means that there 
are many other factors that need to be taken 
into consideration. In this way, we see that 
NRL is part of  the centralized corporative 
system and to some degree also part of  the 
decentralized co-management system. 
Decentralized power through co-management 
Revision of  the reindeer husbandry law
By request of  NRL, MAF appointed a law 
committee (LC) in November of  1998 that was 
going to review parts of  the 1978 law17. A pro-
fessor of  law, Kirsti Strøm Bull, was appointed 
17  The 1978 law is detailed and the law commit-
tee’s mandate is only regarding parts of  the 
law: (1) government and management of  rein-
deer husbandry and (2) the internal relations in 
reindeer husbandry. The latter also includes the 
legal position of  each reindeer owner (NOU 
2001: 35:19).  
its leader and among the appointed members 
more than half  are reindeer owners (NOU, 
2001:35:18-19; Ot.prp.nr.25(2006-2007):7). Af-
ter the LC had begun its work, it informed the 
Norwegian government that its revisions were 
so comprehensive that the LC would instead 
put forward a proposal for a new reindeer hus-
bandry law. Each revised element was voted on 
by the members, and in the new proposal we 
can read who voted for what solutions. In what 
follows I will discuss some of  the changes that 
the majority of  the LC suggested regarding the 
co-management boards.
It appears to be the case that the LC’s ma-
jority wanted more power-sharing between 
the government and industry and more influ-
ence on the part of  reindeer owners (NOU, 
2001:35:107-110, 118). The LC justifies this 
autonomy with much stronger sanctions for 
reindeer owners when rules are broken. Ac-
cording to the LC, the industry should have 
self-determination and influence but also 
more responsibilities for its actions (NOU 
2001:35:123-128). 
Important aspects for local level co-
management
The LC’s point of  departure has been to find 
ways to better match the management system 
to reindeer husbandry at the local level (NOU, 
2001:35:89, 131-132). It has also wanted to 
increase reindeer owners’ legal protections as 
well as to secure public interests. Therefore, it 
has been essential to identify and distinguish 
between peoples’ private interests and the pub-
lic interests. However, because reindeer own-
ers have competing interests between them-
selves in relation to public interests, it might 
be difficult for them to manage a system in 
the best way for everyone (Bull, 1995:402-
403; Karlstad, 1998:252-253, 255-256; NOU 
2001:35:105). This is, of  course, an argument 
in favour of  excluding public interests from 
decisions made at the local level. 
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In the previous 1978 law the district boards 
are instructed to make decisions that affect 
other private interests in the district (Bull, 
1995:400-401; Karlstad, 1998:251). This goes 
against legal disqualification rules in Norwe-
gian law, because all families in a district know 
each other since the families have practiced 
reindeer husbandry in these districts together 
or side by side for a long time (The Civil Ser-
vices Law, §6). Naturally, larger districts are less 
affected by legal disqualification than smaller 
ones. Still, co-management at this level has 
been shown to be difficult in practice. In or-
der for reindeer husbandry to be managed in 
a way that creates order and confidence that is 
best for everyone, it has been found that the 
local level should only manage private interests 
coming under civil law. This is still difficult, be-
cause for the local level to be able to manage 
private interests most of  its management tasks 
must remain the same. It may look like pub-
lic and private management tasks are difficult 
to separate because private obligations are the 
same as public duties: (1) represent the inter-
ests of  the district, (2) protect the pasture areas 
in the district, (3) reach settlements, sue and be 
sued on behalf  of  the reindeer owners in the 
districts where common interests are at stake, 
and (4) develop regimes for usage of  the pas-
tures, which must also be approved by the area 
board. Some argue that this suggested change 
will result in the same problems the districts 
boards had in the 1978 law, because decisions 
made at the district level are still under public 
control (Hågvar, 2006:252-253, 256). The gov-
ernment states that there are many examples 
where private decisions and dispositions are 
subjected to public control through approval 
(St.prp.nr.25 (2006-2007):41-42). Even though 
the issue of  local participation and decision-
making is a difficult element in management, 
Jentoft argues that user groups are currently 
expected to be part of  decision-making pro-
cesses. The difficult dilemma is how to do this 
in a fair and legitimate way for all parties (Jen-
toft, 1998:163).
Election and voting procedures at the 
local level
Another source of  conflict among reindeer 
owners/families in some of  the districts has 
been unfair decision-making. A democrat-
ic one-man one-vote situation could result 
in a ‘tyranny of  the majority’ when fami-
lies (or clans) have different interests (Bull, 
1995:402-403; Karlstad, 1998:255-256; NOU 
2001:35:104-105). Since we find the same fami-
lies year after year within the same districts, this 
unevenness can last for years. With conflicts 
and disharmony in one part of  the system, it 
is difficult to make the rest of  it work (Scott, 
2003:91). In order to make the management 
system better match the social conditions, the 
LC suggests several changes; first of  all, it sug-
gests reintroducing the traditional Sami name 
for the group of  herders working together, the 
Siida18. Thereafter, it proposes to divide the si-
ida into different siida shares. The LC suggests 
the introduction of  election rules and voting 
procedures that are better adapted to the social 
relations among the reindeer owners in the dis-
tricts. Since the members themselves are rein-
deer owners with private interests in many of  
the cases that are dealt with in the board, it is 
important to make sure that a majority cannot 
overrule a minority. Clear rules can make it so 
that this issue is avoided and make sure that 
the districts’ different interests are proportion-
ally represented (NOU 2001:35:105-106). The 
board members are elected for two years at a 
time. The LC also suggests that boards should 
be elected within each siida to work as a contact 
18  The term siida was introduced in the 1978 law 
when parts if  it were changed in 1996 (Ot.prp.
nr.28 (1994-95). The 2007 law goes further and 
wants to replace the reindeer husbandry unit 
with a siida share, because it is the siida that 
constitutes the group of  herders working to-
gether (NOU 2001:35:96-97).
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point between the siida and the district board 
(see Fig. 5)19. This is a lot of  administration 
but the LC believes that a well-arranged man-
agement system at the local level will lead to 
better social relations, increased trust and bet-
ter co-operation among the reindeer owners 
(NOU 2001:35:165). This is a difficult goal for 
the LC to achieve, because a complex co-man-
agement regime is difficult to design. In order 
for the co-management regime to work well, 
legitimacy for the system is needed among the 
reindeer owners.     
Empowerment for the regional co-man-
agement level–the area boards 
According to the LC, in order to function as 
co-management boards the six area boards 
need to be delegated enough power. It needs 
to be a fair representation of  board members 
from the most important stakeholder groups 
(NOU 2001:35:116). This is a classic problem 
in management, the issue of  how much pow-
er central government dares to delegate. Us-
ers almost always feel that too little power is 
delegated to them (Christensen et al., 2004:72, 
98). Bjerkli argues that of  all types of  man-
agements, it is in the management of  natural 
resources that the government delegates the 
least amount of  power to user-groups. The 
main argument used by the authorities is that 
natural resources are viewed as a public good 
for everyone and therefore need special pro-
tection (Bjerkli, 2002:55). The LC argues that 
changing the appointment system is the only 
way to increase the area board’s power and to 
implement what the LC refers to as actual co-
management. Therefore, the LC argues that 
NRL should have a greater say in the appoint-
ment processes for the area boards. In a seven 
19  This system is very detailed and this article will 
only explain the most important aspects, which 
are to explore how co-management is imple-
mented in management of  the industry, and 
give an overview of  the whole process of  the 
revision of  the law.  
member board it thus suggests that two mem-
bers and deputy members should be appointed 
by NRL’s regional branches, two members and 
deputy members should be appointed by the 
County Council20, two members and deputy 
members should be appointed by the Sami 
Parliament and all three parties should agree 
upon the leader. With five members and dep-
uty members, still two should be appointed by 
NRL’s regional branches, one by the County 
Council, one by the Sami Parliament and they 
should together agree upon the leader. The LC 
also states that NRL should be allowed to sug-
gest members when the Sami Parliament and 
the County Council are selecting their repre-
sentatives. In addition, the LC suggests that 
the area boards themselves, or if  asked by the 
leader of  a siida share, a siida or a district, can 
decide that it shall be arbitrated between two 
parties that cannot reach an agreement (NOU 
2001:35:117-118). 
More resources and support to the area 
boards
Further, the LC suggests placing the area 
boards under the County Governor (Fylkesman-
nen). Currently, the area boards are independent 
boards; only the appointment of  members is 
handled by other institutions (County Council 
and the Sami Parliament). The County Gov-
ernor is the power unit that makes sure that 
governmental policies are implemented on the 
regional level. This unit, according to the LC, 
is therefore more equipped with expertise in 
different fields, for instance, in legal and envi-
ronmental affairs, case-procedures, human re-
sources and so forth. The LC states that most 
other regional management bodies are placed 
under the County Governor and such a move 
would make the area boards better informed 
about the county municipality management 
plans, as well as to be more able to coordinate 
20  Or by the County Governor if  the area boards 
should be moved, this will be discussed later. 
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their work with other management bodies 
(NOU 2001:35:115-116). MAF did not agree 
on this organizational change21 (Ot.prp.nr.25 
(2006-2007):48). 
Another reason for this suggestion is that the 
area boards need support-systems for impend-
ing decisions. If  decisions they make are not 
becoming operative, then the boards have lim-
ited power and their decisions a limited effect. 
Subsequently, this will reduce user-groups’ le-
gitimacy for the co-management system. It is 
the task of  the regional administration offices, 
as the area boards’ secretariats, to implement 
decisions made by the board members. How-
ever, the regional administrations are loaded 
with work and it has been difficult for them to 
keep up (Bull, 1995:407; NOU 2001:35:116). 
More power for the industry in ap-
pointments to the Reindeer Husbandry 
Board
The LC believes it is of  importance that the 
highest board is also comprised of  members 
with local knowledge about social organiza-
tion and traditional activities, as well as formal 
and general knowledge. The LC suggests that 
more than half  of  its members should be rein-
deer owners in order to make the co-manage-
ment regime work well. It therefore suggests 
changing the appointment system at this board 
level as well; two members and deputy mem-
bers should be appointed by NRL, two by the 
Sami Parliament, two by MAF and the leader 
should be appointed by all three parties to-
gether. Regarding members appointed by the 
21  In an earlier reindeer husbandry law (1933), 
the management of  reindeer husbandry was 
subjected to the County Governor. This was 
not viewed as a good management solution for 
the industry, and was therefore changed in the 
1978 law. The Sami Parliament did not support 
this suggestion either and argues that such a 
move might distance reindeer husbandry from 
the Sami society in general (Ot.prp.nr.25 2006-
2007):48).
Sami Parliament and MAF, the LC suggests 
that NRL also should have the right to make 
suggestions. This means that NRL will be able 
to dominate this board; they did also discuss 
whether this power should be given to NRL or 
if  it was possible to develop a way for this ap-
pointment system to be done directly through 
the reindeer owners. The majority’s conclusion 
was that NRL should make appointments, 
because other systems would be too compli-
cated. Nevertheless, the main point is to em-
power the industry (NOU 2001:35:116). Some 
reindeer owners, especially non-members, 
may not agree that NRL should have this kind 
of  power. The former leader of  NRL, Aslak 
J. Eira, says that the most important thing is 
that the LC’s intensions are followed. “If  many 
[reindeer owners] think that NRL is so inedible, 
it is better that it [the appointment system] goes 
through the district boards instead.” (This author’s 
translation). 
More authority behind decisions made 
by the national co-management board
The LC wants the national Reindeer Husband-
ry Board to be the only court of  appeals for 
decisions made in the area boards. It is impor-
tant in organizational management that there 
is a clear distribution of  responsibility and that 
board representatives have a clear mandate. 
In order to avoid uncertain jurisdiction in the 
treatment of  cases the LC suggests that MAF 
shall not handle appeals lodged by reindeer 
owners who are dissatisfied with the work of  
the area boards. Such appeals are for individual 
cases and MAF should not have anything to do 
with such matters. The main point here is that 
MAF, as most other ministries, should only 
handle policy issues and delegate individual 
decision-making to directorates and subunits. 
This means that MAF should delegate enough 
power and trust to the Reindeer Husbandry 
Board to be able to handle these appeals on 
its own (NOU 2001:35:115-116). The Attor-
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ney General of  civil affairs states in the hearing 
process that such a change may be problem-
atic, because the government will be financial 
liable for decisions made in the boards even 
though it has no authority to influence the dif-
ferent cases handled in the boards. The minis-
ter (for instance the Minister of  MAF) has the 
constitutional and parliamentary responsibil-
ity for decisions made in the ministry (MAF) 
(Regjeringsadvokaten, 2002:4-5).  
Unanimity among reform suggestions?
It is likely that NRL will be empowered as a 
result of  the changes described above. This is 
considered controversial by reindeer owners 
who are critical of  NRL being a representa-
tive of  the industry. The majority of  the LC 
(nine out of  ten) suggested that it should be 
NRL because other ways of  organizing this 
appointment system would be overly compli-
cated. Another issue at stake is whether an in-
dustrial interest organization should both be a 
representative for reindeer owners as well as 
a management body. The majority of  the LC 
argues that they are well aware of  this compli-
cated situation but without appointments from 
the industry it is not actual co-management. 
They argue further that the main point is not 
about who appoints the reindeer owners but 
about the implementation of  a system where 
there is more empowerment of  the industry. 
If  this is to be done, the industry must also 
be an appointing body in this management 
regime (NOU 2001:35:118). The Norwegian 
Bar Association states in the hearing process 
that it agrees that the industry should appoint 
members, however, it also suggested that this 
should be done by the district boards, and not 
by NRL (Advokatforeningen, 2002:17).  
Obviously, it is difficult to find workable solu-
tions that most parties and people agree upon, 
which makes organizational change very diffi-
cult. Knowledge and experience are necessary 
in order to know what to do and how to reach 
important objectives. But also, it is difficult to 
be able to foresee the effects of  such changes 
because of  changes in the political and insti-
tutional environments (Scott, 2003:220-224). 
We also see that not all reindeer owners agree 
with the system of  direct appointments to the 
different boards by the industry. Whether this 
happens through NRL or the district boards, 
some owners worry about representatives’ 
ability to work for long-term goals and for the 
best interests of  the region as a whole, instead 
of  their own individual or group interests. We 
are looking at the relations between various 
members that can act as both individuals and 
collectives. The relationship between the actor 
and the system is formally well defined but in 
many situations can also become blurry (Au-
bert, 1991:186-189). This is a difficult dilemma 
in all kinds of  organizations because all mem-
bers are affected by both their personal and 
professional backgrounds. 
MAFs proposal for a draft law
New procedures for consultation
The proposal from the LC was finished in 
March 2001. It was sent out to different stake-
holder groups and institutions for comment in 
March 2002 with a deadline of  August 2002. 
In the meantime, between the LC’s sugges-
tions and MAF’s proposal in January 2007, a 
Royal Decree was implemented on the 1st of  
July, 2005. The Sami people of  Norway now 
have the right to be consulted in cases that can 
affect them directly. This right is stated in the 
ILO convention no. 169, article 6, concerning 
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent 
Countries (ILO convention). A working group 
with representatives from the Sami Parlia-
ment and the Ministry of  Labour and Social 
Inclusion has prepared a report that gives an 
account of  judicial foundation for indigenous 
people’s rights to consultations. The document 
contains guidelines for consultations between 
state authorities and the Sami Parliament and 
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was signed on the 11th of  May, 2005 by the 
Minister of  Labour and Social Inclusion and 
the President of  the Sami Parliament. The 
guidelines state that consultations must be a 
genuine dialogue between the parties with the 
common goal of  reaching an understanding 
(Arbeids- og inkluderingsdepartementet [Ministry 
of  Labour and Social Inclusion], 2005). The 
Sami Parliament and NRL have therefore been 
consulted by MAF throughout its work with 
the changes of  the 1978 law (Ot.prp. nr. 25 
(2006-2007):9-10). 
The draft law proposal
The LC’s recommendation that the area 
boards can request arbitration if  two parties 
cannot come to an agreement is endorsed by 
MAF (Reindriftsloven, 2007, §73). With this as 
the exception, we will in this part of  the law 
revision only see what MAF proposes for the 
boards at the local level22. MAF has exceeded 
the treatment of  the LC’s suggestions regard-
ing the Reindeer Husbandry Board and the six 
area boards until the next time the law is up 
for revision (Reindriftsforvaltningen, 2006:19)23. 
With only a few exceptions, MAF has followed 
almost all the suggestions from the LC on the 
local level (Ot.prp. nr. 25 (2006-2007): 76-77, 
82-84)24. 
A well-working system on the local level is 
important for the overall system. Viewing the 
larger picture of  management, however, the 
22  There are other changes in the law as well, but 
this article is only reviewing the co-management 
boards. 
23  This means that the 2007 law, at the district 
level, is identical to the law proposed by the 
LC and discussed here under the sub headlines 
“Important aspects for local level co-manage-
ment” and “Election and voting procedures at 
the local level”. 
24  The few issues in which the Sami Parliament 
and the NRL disagreed with the MAF are dis-
cussed below under the sub headline “The Sami 
Parliament disagrees”. 
co-management boards on the political level 
are rather important as well. How these co-
management boards function internally is an 
important foundation for reindeer owner’s le-
gitimacy for the management boards. It is also 
essential that the board functions externally 
in co-operation with other management bod-
ies, in order to obtain legitimacy from interest 
groups outside the reindeer herding industry 
(Jentoft, 2000:145). 
Other opportunities for the reindeer herding industry
Some representatives of  NRL and other rein-
deer owners have argued that there should be 
reindeer owners in both boards who are not 
politically elected, but are elected as represen-
tatives for the industry25. MAF did not meet 
such a demand in the law revision, but it must 
be emphasized that neither the previous 1978 
law (§7-8) nor the current 2007 law (§71-72), 
says that the Sami Parliament has to appoint 
their own politicians. The law text only says that 
the boards must have a reasonable geographic 
distribution, mixed professional qualifications, 
and relatively equal representation of  men and 
women. The Sami Parliament confirms that its 
endeavor is to appoint members that are both 
politicians as well as reindeer owners. The Sami 
Parliament appoints members that they know 
will do the job that is expected of  them; there-
fore their appointment is based on knowledge 
about the candidates’ fundamental political val-
ues. In order to elect board members who live 
as reindeer owners and can easily relate to local 
issues, they most often appoint members who 
are not very politically active26. The Sami Par-
liament often listens to NRL’s suggestions, but 
it is important to emphasize that since NRL 
has a relatively low rate of  membership, it is 
25  Interviews reveal that there are NRL members 
that believe that the industry should not have 
direct representation at the political level. 
26  This could be people who have retired from 
politics, people who are taking a break or only 
working part-time in politics. 
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also the Sami Parliament’s duty to look at oth-
er candidates when appropriate (pers. comm. 
Willy Ørnebakk27, the Sami Parliament). 
It is also obvious now that the reindeer own-
ers have a tool for power with the new agree-
ment regarding consultations. Both the area 
boards and the Reindeer Husbandry Board 
are management bodies and must, according 
to the consultation agreement and the ILO 
convention, consult with reindeer owners 
that are affected by decisions made in these 
boards. However, it is difficult to predict how 
this will work in practice. To what degree do 
people need to be effected in order for consul-
tations to be a necessary and natural process? 
Changes that are essential to reindeer owners 
and which affect conflicts of  interest could be 
constructive and of  value to consult on. The 
political process will take longer but perhaps 
the support will be greater. 
The Sami Parliament disagrees
There are always some disagreements when 
new policies are implemented. The Sami Par-
liament states that it is generally satisfied with 
the consultations it had with the government28. 
However, because the government only gave 
the Sami Parliament access to the different 
provisions that were proposed and not the 
comments to the provisions, it was difficult for 
the Sami Parliament to gain a clear and mu-
tual understanding (Sametinget, 2007:1). MAF 
states that this is the first law of  importance 
for Sami interests that was produced after the 
procedures for consultation were implemented 
in 2005. There has, therefore, been some chal-
lenges linked to how the consultations should 
be executed (Ot.prp.nr25 (2006-2007):10). The 
Sami Parliament’s opinion is that the govern-
27  Willy Ørnebakk is the parliamentary leader for 
the Labour Party’s (Arbeiderpartiets) Sami Par-
liament group (sametingsgruppe)
28  Five meetings were held between the Sami Par-
liament and MAF, four of  them were on the 
political level. 
ment has not fully followed the consultation 
procedures in the manner that the ILO Con-
vention 169 requires. The Sami Parliament still 
believes that further consultations could have 
led to an agreement on the few issues that the 
two parties could not agree upon (Sametinget, 
2007:1).
Firstly, during the consultations the Sami 
Parliament has been clear on the matter re-
garding international law. Because reindeer 
husbandry is an important Sami industry and 
a carrier of  culture, reindeer husbandry must 
have international judicial protection. If  it 
should be the case that domestic law conflicts 
with international law, international law must 
take precedence; § 3 states that the law applies 
in accordance with international law, but the 
Sami Parliament states that this is not enough. 
In order to secure this claim, the Sami Parlia-
ment argues that § 3 should state that the new 
reindeer husbandry law applies with those lim-
itations that are pursuant to the ILO Conven-
tion 169 (Sametinget, 2007:2-3). 
Secondly, the Sami Parliament disagrees with 
the decision stating that when districts exceed 
the maximum allowable reindeer number, all 
reindeer owners must reduce their herd pro-
portionally (§60). The Sami Parliament views 
this as unfair and endorses the LC’s suggestion 
that reindeer owners with 200 or fewer animals 
should not have to reduce their numbers, un-
less all reindeer owners in the district have less 
than 200 animals. The Sami Parliament and the 
LC believe that a reindeer owner with a small 
herd should be made to suffer less than a rein-
deer owner with a large herd29. They also argue 
that by protecting reindeer owners with smaller 
herds, it will also protect the youth who are in 
a stage of  establishing themselves in the indus-
try and who are probably the most important 
29 Many reindeer owners have followed the gov-
ernment’s measures to prevent reindeer num-
bers from increasing. Reindeer owners should 
not suffer for this when new policies are made. 
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labour resource (Sametinget, 2007:2-3). MAF 
states that the new law gives the siida members 
the authority to reduce their numbers as they 
see fit, so that they themselves can prevent that 
owners with less than 200 animals must reduce 
their herd. It is only if  the members of  the si-
ida cannot make a reduction together, that this 
model applies (Ot.prp.nr.25 (2006-2007):46). 
The Sami Parliament says that it will not give 
up, and expects new negotiations regarding 
this issue as soon as the rest of  the law will 
be up for revision (Sametinget, 2007:3). Jentoft 
(2000) argues that “a management system is 
legitimate to the extent that it works both in-
strumentally and morally among user-groups” 
(Jentoft, 2000:145). In this case, the manage-
ment system must both reduce the number of  
reindeer at the same time as it is going to be 
a fair and legitimate system for the reindeer 
owners.  
Diverging views on types of  participation
The Norwegian management regime of  rein-
deer husbandry currently consists of  two 
equally important management models; the 
corporative and the co-management orga-
nization. The LC’s suggestion seems to be a 
weakening of  the corporative organization and 
a profound strengthening of  the co-manage-
ment organization. By suggesting that NRL 
should be given co-managerial responsibili-
ties to the degree that the LC suggests, it may 
change NRL to become more of  a manage-
ment body than an interest organization. This 
suggestion, however, was not followed by the 
government. It is also important to emphasize 
that the LC’s intention was only to involve 
the industry and this was one of  several ways 
to do exactly that. Further, the LC wanted to 
strengthen the power of  the reindeer own-
ers by trying to give them participation rights 
mainly as reindeer owners and not just as po-
litical representatives for political organiza-
tions (NOU 2001: 35:118). This would give the 
reindeer owners of  Norway the unique chance 
of  being an important and actual part of  the 
co-management system, and not just a formal 
part of  the system. A reindeer owner from 
Finnmark said: “It is us reindeer owners that know 
the local environment best, and we should therefore be 
part of  the [co-management] boards and be part of  
decision-making”. (This author’s translation).
A change of  the co-management board at 
the national level and the six co-management 
boards at the regional level have been put on 
hold until further notice (Ot.prp.nr.25 (2006-
2007):48). Therefore, we still see a struggle 
between autonomy and control between user-
groups and government, which is a classic is-
sue in resource management. It is important to 
emphasize that it is not the unanimous opinion 
among the reindeer owners that there should 
be so much power for the reindeer owners. A 
reindeer owner from Hedmark said: “It is politi-
cians in the Parliament, and that is the way it should 
be here [in the board’s] too. What if  we were to just 
pick a man from the street and place him in the Parlia-
ment?” (This author’s translation).
Still, some30 argue that the LC’s initial sug-
gestions were part of  a general and extensive 
proposition where the different parts of  the 
proposal are connected. It is less likely that 
the LC would suggest these strong sanctions 
for reindeer owners, without increased influ-
ence for the industry in the co-management 
boards at the political level (Ot.prp.nr.25 
(2006-2007):50). Jentoft (2000) argues that one 
should first think in terms of  legitimacy, and 
then start the planning for how to achieve le-
gitimacy. “Legitimacy is a premise and not only 
an outcome of  a management system” (Jen-
toft, 2000:144). When this is said, it is impor-
tant to emphasize that many reindeer owners 
and others are satisfied with this law and view 
30  The Sami Parliament, some NRL politicians 
and some reindeer owners. The organization 
NRL states that it is satisfied that the law proc-
ess has come this far. 
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it as a step in the right direction, even though 
some call for further revision of  the previous 
1978-law.        
Conclusion
In this discussion we have seen that many 
people are involved in the co-management of  
reindeer husbandry in Norway. Reindeer own-
ers are given a lot of  power in governance and 
many opportunities for participation through 
the corporative and the co-managerial systems. 
We have also seen a comprehensive review 
of  the law in order to increase legitimacy for 
the regime. Still, some reindeer owners do not 
give the law much credit. Durkheim (1995) ar-
gues that people will never be satisfied unless 
their needs are limited by a higher authority. 
He argues further that the limits put on their 
needs have to be made by a higher authority 
that the people respect, an authority that allo-
cates resources in the best way for the people 
(Durkheim, 1995:132-134). There is no so-
lution for how this should be achieved, but 
many argue that this is better achieved through 
a co-management regime than through a hier-
archical top-down management regime (Jen-
toft, 1998:163-164). It is difficult, however, to 
implement such regimes in reality and Scott 
(2003:89-94) argues that one can never safe-
guard against mistakes. 
Firstly, political representation is the main 
form of  representation in this system. On the 
one hand, political representation has been jus-
tified as an organizational form well suited to 
link those who rule with those who are ruled. 
On the other hand, this kind of  representation 
may give the reindeer owners a feeling of  dis-
tance between them and the co-management 
regime (Olsen, 1992:16-7, 39-49; Christensen 
et al., 2004:113-115). The LC sees it as neces-
sary for the industry to be represented directly 
in the co-management boards, or else it is not 
really co-management. A crucial question is: 
Will this give the industry better prospects? 
Another important issue here is if  direct repre-
sentation from the industry will increase legiti-
macy or will such representation make people 
expect more, and thus legitimacy more difficult 
to obtain (Jentoft, 2000:145). The complexity 
of  such representative systems makes it prob-
lematic to argue that one type of  representa-
tion functions better than the other.
Secondly, lack of  power may not be the ma-
jor challenge, but rather the lack of  a network 
of  contacts. Why is there so limited horizontal 
and vertical communication and co-operation 
between the levels in the system of  the man-
agement of  reindeer husbandry? In the formal 
network of  interaction, there are few formal 
meetings where the members can exchange 
information and advice between the different 
boards. Except from the ordinary treatment 
of  cases, there is little or no contact among 
the various areas boards, and between the area 
boards and the Reindeer Husbandry Board. 
Scott (2003) argues that the most important 
aspect of  making such extensive systems work 
well is that communication and information 
flows through the systems (Scott, 2003:90-92). 
Interviews reveal that representatives from 
some of  the area boards feel that they need 
more interaction between the co-management 
boards in order to learn more from each other, 
or to receive some advice from other boards 
that have been handling similar cases. Equality 
in the treatment of  cases is important; people 
compare their own situation to that of  others 
and want the same treatment (Berger & Luck-
man, 1966:149-166; Scott, 2003:91)  
Thirdly, it is important to emphasize that 
comprehensive and complex organizational 
systems quite often experience tensions and 
legitimacy issues among designers and par-
ticipants (March & Olsen, 2006:12-15). In the 
case of  Norwegian reindeer husbandry, many 
of  these tensions and legitimacy issues seem to 
be decentralized down to the industrial level. 
Jentoft (1998:71-72, 164-165) argues that the 
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purpose of  co-management is to strengthen 
legitimacy and decrease conflicts among so-
cial actors. Why do we find so many conflicts 
in this co-management system? Those who 
are sceptical of  co-management say that such 
a regime is next to impossible to implement 
successfully, because it cannot work in mod-
ern societies with its technology, international 
competition and industrial production. They 
also say that it cannot work in larger systems 
(Jentoft, 1998:72-74). Some argue that a co-
management system may score high on the 
internal legitimacy scale and low on external 
legitimacy, because those who are not included 
will feel that they are treated unfairly (Jentoft, 
1998:176). 
This study demonstrates that some of  the 
groups involved still do not view the system 
as being legitimate. Why is this? This dissatis-
faction may be the result of  power-struggles, 
because the groups involved have different 
degrees of  power. For instance, in the trian-
gular relationship between NRL, the Sami Par-
liament, and the County Council, where only 
the latter two have the authority to appoint 
members to the boards, we see that the part 
that is most dependent on the resource is the 
part with the least power. Theory on co-man-
agement suggests the contrary–that the stake-
holders with the most at stake should have the 
most power (Jentoft, 1998:172). Jentoft argues 
further that there is no formula for how power 
is shared, because this depends on each unique 
situation (Jentoft, 1998:172). It is difficult to 
compose boards that are fair and just for all 
stakeholders and there are many elements that 
need to be taken into account. The question 
is if  this is possible in practice. Karlstad states 
that he cannot see how the district boards 
can be composed without any one group get-
ting more power than the others (Karlstad, 
1998:265). He states further that rules may 
not solve conflict issues if  the board members 
“find it unpleasant to intervene when mem-
bers neglect their obligation (…)” (Karlstad, 
1998:258). 
Scott argues that there will sometimes be 
groups that achieve a better foothold in the 
system than others because of  people’s differ-
ent abilities, political belonging, connections 
and so forth (Scott, 2003:133). These prob-
lematic co-management issues are discussed 
in the literature but could use more empha-
sis. With this in mind, it is obvious that the 
LC has had a complicated task in revising the 
rules and regulations in the management of  
Norwegian reindeer husbandry. Although not 
endorsed by the government, the LC did also 
suggest industrial representation in the boards 
at the political level. Most of  these changes are 
suggested in order to decrease conflicts and in-
crease legitimacy for the system. How this re-
vised system will work is too early to say. It is, 
however, argued that no regime enjoys the full 
support and compliance of  all its citizens (Ol-
sen, 1992:16; March & Olsen 2006:14). Dis-
cussions about change will therefore be a con-
tinuous process. The management regime of  
reindeer husbandry will thus frequently be in 
flux. This is a natural element of  being part of  
a democracy (Christensen et al., 2004:56-57).
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Forvaltningen av reindriften i Norge – maktfordeling og deltakelse
Abstract in Norwegian / Sammendrag: Myndigheter i mange land har erkjent at å innbefatte ressursbrukere i forvalt-
ningsmessige beslutningsprosesser skaper en mer rettmessig forvaltningspolitikk. For å øke medvirkningen for res-
sursbrukere har norske myndigheter iverksatt to ulike forvaltningsmodeller i den samiske reindriften. På den ene siden 
er det innført et korporativt system hvor utvalgte reineiere representerer reindriften i de årlige forhandlingene med 
myndighetene. På den andre siden er det iverksatt et medforvaltningssystem hvor reineiere er representert i styrer på 
lokalt, regionalt og nasjonalt nivå. Staten har også delegert en del forvaltningsgjøremål til disse styrene. Likevel har det 
gjennom media, spørreundersøkelser og intervjuer, kommet frem at noen reineiere er misfornøyde med forvaltnings-
systemet og at de føler seg ekskludert fra deltakelse. Jeg argumenterer derfor for at oppnevningen av reineiere til de 
ulike medforvaltningsstyrene og oppnevning av reineiere til det korporative organ er en delvis uløst utfordring fordi 
det er vanskelig å etablere et representasjonssystem som føles rettferdig for alle. Jeg påviser også at det er vanskelig å 
få slike sammensatte systemer til å fungere like godt i praksis som de var planlagt.
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